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ABSTRACT 
 
Criminal courts increasingly rely upon scientific evidence provided by expert witnesses. This raises a number of 
questions for the courts including what type of science they should admit and who should be allowed to give such 
evidence. The admissibility framework for scientific evidence in England and Wales (E&W) originates from the 
1975 case of R v. Turner, [1975] QB 834. Under Turner, expert evidence is admissible as long as it is beyond the 
understanding of the fact-finders. This common law framework has been interpreted and developed and it now 
consists of a mismatch of court decisions from E&W, Australia, Canada and the United States of America (US). 
This framework does not seem to reflect the four decades of significant scientific advances that have taken place 
since Turner. There have been a number of prominent trials in the US and in E&W where scientific evidence has 
been associated with an improper verdict. This paper suggests that controversies related to Shaken Baby Syndrome 
(SBS) / Abusive Head Trauma (AHT) expose the weaknesses of admissibility frameworks in the US and, more 
specifically, in E&W. It concludes that the triad of symptoms frequently used to diagnose SBS/AHT is not reliable, 
and that courts need to consider more closely significant advances in the understanding of the symptoms 
previously believed to indicate that an infant had been shaken, before admitting such evidence in court.     
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Forensic science, or “the application of science in the resolution of legal disputes”,1 has become an integral part 
of the criminal justice systems in the United States of America (US) and in England and Wales (E&W). It is 
beneficial to the process of justice that scientific methods and techniques have the potential to draw links between 
victims, perpetrators and crime scenes.2 Criminal and civil courts often rely upon scientific evidence provided by 
                                                          
* Senior Lecturer, Institute of Criminal Justice Studies, University of Portsmouth, 141 High Street, Portsmouth, PO1 2HY, 
UK; marika.henneberg@port.ac.uk.  
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1 ANDREW R.W. JACKSON & JULIE M. JACKSON, FORENSIC SCIENCE xv (2d ed. 2010). 
2 See EDMOND LOCARD, TRAITÉ DE CRIMINALISTIQUE  (1940); Id.; STUART H. JAMES & JON J. NORDBY, FORENSIC SCIENCE: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO SCIENTIFIC AND INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES, (3d ed. 2009); W. Jerry Chisum & Brent E. Turvey, Evidence 
Dynamics: Locard’s Exchange Principles & Crime Reconstruction, 1(1) J. BEHAV. PROFILING (2000).  
2 
 
expert witnesses to settle different types of legal disputes. This inevitably increases the risk that ‘junk science’3 
may be admitted in courts in the US and in E&W.4  
It is, undoubtedly, a hard task for judges and jurors to adjudge topics which may have taken years for a scientist 
to become proficient in.5 Collecting, preparing, analysing and presenting scientific evidence all require high levels 
of training, expertise and skill, and it would be naive to suggest that the intricacies of any field of forensic science 
can be fully understood by judges, lawyers or jurors (or indeed scientists).6 Nevertheless, judges need to decide 
whether or not to admit scientific evidence, lawyers need to be able to use expert evidence to support their case 
and effectively challenge the views of the opposing side’s experts during cross examination, and jurors have the 
important task of deciding, based on the evidence that they have heard, whether the defendant is guilty or not.  
Part II reviews the admissibility of scientific evidence in the US through an exploration of significant cases. The 
Supreme Court of the United States (USSC) confronted concerns that the US courts were admitting ‘junk science’ 
in a sequence of decisions in the 1990s.7 In effect, these decisions made it clear that judges had a ‘gate-keeping’ 
role to decide on the scientific validity of proffered expert evidence.8 Research and publications have since tried 
to identify what ‘science’ or research satisfy the USSC’s criteria, and to encourage the scientific education of 
lawyers and judges. 9  The US approach to admissibility has been adopted by a number of Commonwealth 
jurisdictions,10 but never, formally, in the United Kingdom (UK).11  
Part III reviews the development of the common law admissibility framework in E&W. There have been a number 
of prominent trials in E&W where scientific evidence has been associated with an improper verdict.12 The House 
of Commons’ Science and Technology Committee expressed concerns about the quality of scientific evidence 
being admitted by the courts in E&W in 2005, and the Law Commission of E&W was tasked with investigating 
the issue.13 The Law Commission confirmed that there were some serious problems and proposed a Bill.14 The 
Law Commission’s approach was not to focus upon the scientific status of the evidence proffered (which, broadly, 
                                                          
3 See PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURT ROOM (1991). The term ‘junk science’, despite not 
being coined by the author, gained popularity after the publication.    
4 For the situation in the US, see COMMITTEE ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIENCE COMMUNITY, NATIONAL 
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES (NRC), STRENGTHENING THE FORENSIC SCIENCES IN THE US: A PATH 
FORWARD (The National Academies Press, 2009) [hereinafter NRC REPORT], and for England and Wales, see THE LAW 
COMMISSION, THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN ENGLAND AND WALES: A NEW 
APPROACH TO THE DETERMINATION OF EVIDENTIARY RELIABILITY (2009), available at 
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/cp190_Expert_Evidence_Consultation.pdf [hereinafter THE LAW COMMISSION 
2009].  
5 For more comprehensive discussions on this see, e.g., Peter W. Huber, Junk Science and the Jury, U. CHI. LEGAL  F. 273 
(1990) and Edith Greene & Lawrence Wrightsman, Decision Making by Juries and Judges: International Perspectives, in 
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY IN LEGAL CONTEXTS, 401-422 (Ray Bull & David Carson eds. 2d ed. 2003).  
6 Greene & Wrightsman, supra note 5. 
7 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 509 U.S. 579 (1993); General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); 
Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).   
8 KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (2d ed. 2002). 
9 This includes the five volume multi-edition product edited by Faigman et al. (e.g. the 2013-2014 edition), see DAVID 
FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, VOLS 1-5 (2013-2014) and 
the one-thousand page document by the Federal Judicial Center, see FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTRE, REFERENCE MANUAL ON 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE  (3d ed. 2011), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/SciMan3D01.pdf/$file/SciMan3D01.pdf.    
10 Simon A. Cole, Splitting Hairs? Evaluating ‘Split Testimony’ as an Approach to the Problem of Forensic Expert 
Evidence, 33 SYDNEY L. REV.  459 (2011).  
11 THE LAW COMMISSION 2009, supra note 4.   
12Successful appeals include R v. Dallagher, [2002] EWCA Crim 1903 (appeal taken from Eng.) where ear print comparison 
evidence had been the major evidence in a murder conviction, and R v. Clark (No 2), [2003] EWCA Crim 1020 (appeal 
taken from Eng.), where improperly cited statistics and a failure to disclose results of medical tests had resulted in two 
murder convictions. These will be discussed in detail in Part III.  
13 THE LAW COMMISSION 2009, supra note 4.    
14 THE LAW COMMISSION, EXPERT EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN ENGLAND AND WALES (2011), available at 
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc325_Expert_Evidence_Report.pdf [hereinafter THE LAW COMMISSION 2011].  
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had been the USSC’s approach), but rather its reliability.15 However, the Government rejected the proposals for 
reform in November 2013,16 citing expenses as one of the reasons for the rejection.17  
Part IV considers medical and scientific evidence in relation to Shaken Baby Syndrome (SBS) / Abusive Head 
Trauma (AHT). Whilst medical evidence has a long history of recognition by the courts in the US and E&W, 
some diagnoses, such as Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS), have been associated with several alleged 
wrongful convictions, especially in E&W.18 SBS, now commonly referred to as Abusive Head Trauma (AHT),19 
has also come under scrutiny after the triad of symptoms believed to be pathognomonic of SBS has been shown 
to have alternative natural or accidental explanations which do not indicate shaking.20 In January, 2015 a group 
of international experts signed an open letter calling for a change in the way courts (in the US and the UK) use 
the “SBS construct”,21 as “it does not have the undivided support of the relevant professional community, an 
essential consideration in the assessment of expert testimony.”22 Controversies around the use of expert evidence 
relating to SBS/AHT in criminal trials have highlighted problematic issues inherent in the adversarial process in 
general, and in relation to the admissibility of such evidence in particular.  
This article concludes that despite efforts to prevent unreliable science from being admitted in court,23 unreliable 
or outdated science is still a major part of the SBS/AHT diagnosis in the US and, especially, in E&W. This article 
suggests that medical and scientific evidence relating to SBS/AHT should no longer be considered reliable, and 
that courts need to consider significant developments in the understanding of the symptoms used to diagnose 
SBS/AHT24 to avoid wrongful convictions.  
II. ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Before the 1920s, courts in the US had applied what some scholars today refer to as the “marketplace test”25 when 
considering admissibility. Under the test, any expert or expertise that consumers had been willing to spend money 
on would be considered sound enough for courts.26 This raised problems as the market would not necessarily 
consider the reliability or validity of an opinion, as expertise of doubtful quality and soundness “may nevertheless 
sell well” 27. In addition, markets may not necessarily reflect the needs of the courts. 28 Concerns about the 
reliability of certain scientific practices were recognised in the 1920s,29 and admissibility frameworks have since 
evolved.  
 
A. FRYE V. UNITED STATES, 293F. 1013 (DC CIRCA. 1923) 
The first important case to deal with admissibility of newly developed areas of science was the 1923 case of Frye 
v. United States.30 In that case, James Frye had been convicted of murder in the second degree.31 During the 
                                                          
15 Id. 
16 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE LAW COMMISSION REPORT: "EXPERT EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL 
PROCEEDINGS IN ENGLAND AND WALES" (LAW COM No 325), 2013 (Eng. Wales), available at  
 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/260369/govt-resp-experts-evidence.pdf.  
17 Skills for Justice, Expert Evidence Changes Rejected, SKILLS FOR JUSTICE, (Nov. 22, 2013, 8:45 AM), 
http://www.sfjuk.com/expert-evidence-changes-rejected/.  
18 John Hartshorne & José Miola, Expert Evidence: Difficulties and Solutions in Prosecutions for Infant Harm, 30(2) LEGAL 
STUD. 279 (2010); THE LAW COMMISSION 2009, supra note 4; THE LAW COMMISSION 2011, supra note 14.  
19 For the purpose of this paper the terms used are Shaken Baby Syndrome (SBS) and Abusive Head Trauma (AHT). A 
number of scholarly papers have used alternative terms such as Non-Accidental Head Trauma/Injury, Shaken Impact Injury 
and Acquired Brain Injury to describe the same issue.  
20 See, e.g., Keith A. Findley et al., Shaken Baby Syndrome, Abusive Head Trauma, and Actual Innocence: Getting it Right, 
12 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL. 209 (2012).  
21 Lynne Wrennall et al., Argument & Critique: Open Letter on Shaken Baby Syndrome and Courts: A False and Flawed 
Premise (2015), available at https://globalwrong.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/open-letter-on-sbs.pdf. 
22 Id.  
23 See supra note 4. 
24 Findley et al., supra note 20.   
25 E.g. Michael J. Saks & David L. Faigman, Expert Evidence after Daubert, 1 ANN. REV. L & SOC. SCI 105 (2005).  
26 Id. at 107.  
27 Id. 
28 Roselle L. Wissler, Keelah E.G. Williams & Michael J. Saks, How Legal Tests for the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence 
Resemble Cognitive Science’s System 1 and System 2, 17(4) VA. J.L. & TECH. 354, 364 (2013). 
29 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 1013. 
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original trial, defence counsel had asked that the result of a systolic blood pressure deception test was admitted as 
evidence, or that Frye should be subjected to such a test in the presence of the jury.32   
 
The claim was that this early predecessor to the polygraph, or lie detector, would detect changes in the systolic 
blood pressure when nervous impulses were sent to the autonomic nervous system, and that these changes 
corresponded to changes in the person’s emotions.33 Scientific experiments were believed to demonstrate how 
“conscious deception or falsehood, concealment of facts, or guilt of crime, accompanied by fear of detection when 
the person is under examination, raises the systolic blood pressure in a curve.”34 This curve would allegedly 
correspond to the struggle going on in the subject’s mind, “between fear and attempted control of that fear, as the 
examination touches the vital points of which he is attempting to deceive the examiner.”35 
 
Although no cases had been found which directly dealt with systolic blood pressure tests, defense counsel in Frye 
maintained that there was a general rule,36 which suggested that opinions of witnesses skilled in a particular 
science, art or trade were admissible in evidence if the question involved required special experience or 
knowledge.37 This would be the case with the systolic blood pressure test, as it required the testimony of a person 
with special knowledge and experience.38  
The appeal court in Frye did not oppose to this, but it challenged the methodology for the systolic blood pressure 
machine.39 The court acknowledged that the level of confidence in a particular scientific methodology needed to 
be determined before it could be admitted in evidence, and that a threshold test would be required.40 The court 
held that: “Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and 
demonstrable stages is difficult to define,”41 and that “the thing from which the deduction is made must be 
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs”.42 The court 
believed that the systolic blood pressure deception test had not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition 
among physiological and psychological authorities that it should be admitted in court.43 
Frye provides that if the methodology at issue is “generally accepted” by the relevant scientific community within 
which it belongs, it should be acceptable to the law and hence admissible in court.44 This was a major advancement 
from the marketplace test as, instead of looking at the consumers of the expertise, there was a shift to look at the 
experts and their credentials, as well as the body of knowledge surrounding the topic.45 It is easy to assume that 
the majority view will be the one that is deemed generally accepted, but general acceptance “is only a very rough 
proxy for scientific validity.” 46 New discoveries or techniques may be developed by a minority part of the 
scientific community, and may take years to gain a wider acceptance.47  
                                                          
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 1014. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id.  
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id.  
43 Id.  
44 This is often referred to as the ‘general acceptance test’, see Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).   
45 Saks & Faigman, supra note 25, at 107.  
46 PAUL ROBERTS & ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (2d ed. 2010) at 497. 
47 Id. 
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Frye continues to be the admissibility test in California,48 Illinois,49 Maryland,50 Minnesota,51 New Jersey,52 New 
York,53 Pennsylvania54 and Washington,55 whereas Florida replaced it 201356 and Kansas in 2014.57 
 
B. DAUBERT V. MERRELL DOW PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., 509 US 579 (1993) 
The USSC reformed the general acceptance test from Frye in the 1993 case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.58 The petitioners in that case were Jason Daubert and Eric Schuller, two minor children 
born with serious birth defects, and their parents.59 Claiming that the birth defects had been caused by the anti-
nausea drug Bendectin, which had been ingested by the two mothers whilst pregnant, the petitioners had sued 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (MDP), the marketer of the drug, in California state court.60 
 
MDP had moved for summary judgment, stating that there was no evidence to suggest that Bendectin caused birth 
defects in humans.61 A physician and epidemiologist, acting as an expert for MDP, examined over 30 published 
studies on Bendectin and human birth defects.62 Benedectin had not been found to be a human teratogen (a 
substance capable of causing malformation in foetuses) in any of the published studies which covered more than 
130,000 patients.63  
 
The petitioners did not contest the summary of the studies provided by MDP’s expert.64 However, they countered 
this conclusion with testimonies from eight different experts, all with impressive credentials.65 These experts drew 
the conclusion that there was a link between Bendectin and birth defects based on malformations that had been 
found in various studies. These studies included animal studies (both in test tube (in vitro) and live (in vivo) 
studies), and pharmacological studies, which showed that Bendectin had a similar structure to other drugs known 
to cause birth defects. They also shaped their conclusions through “the “reanalysis” of previously published 
epidemiological (human statistical) studies.”66  
 
The District Court granted MDP’s motion for summary judgment, stating that scientific evidence would be 
admissible only where the principle upon which it is based is “sufficiently established to have general acceptance 
in the field to which it belongs.”67 The District Court held that the evidence the petitioners presented did not meet 
this standard. This was because it was based on recalculations of data in previously published studies, animal 
studies and chemical-structure analyses.68 In order to establish causation (and be admissible), the court opined 
that the expert opinion evidence should be based on epidemiological data concerning Bendectin.69 Furthermore, 
the evidence the petitioners sought to rely upon had neither been subjected to peer review nor been published.70 
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, stating that expert opinion “based on scientific 
technique is inadmissible unless the technique is “generally accepted” as reliable in the relevant scientific 
community”,71 and that any expert opinion which diverges significantly from the procedures or methodology 
                                                          
48 California Evidence Code §801.  
49 Rule 702, Illinois Rules of Evidence.  
50 Frye was adopted in Maryland in Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (Md., 1978). 
51 Rule 702, Minnesota Court Rules.  
52 Rule 703, New Jersey Rules of Evidence.  
53 N.Y. C.P.L.R. §4515; Giordano v. Market Am., Inc., 15 N.Y.3d 590, 601, 941 N.E.2d 727, (2010); People v. Kanani, 272 
A.D.2d 186, 186, 709 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1st Dept. 2000).  
54 Rule 702, Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence.  
55 Rule 703, Washington Rules of Evidence.  
56 Florida Evidence Code 90.702.  
57 Kansas Statutes Annotated 60-456.  
58 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
59 Id. at 2791. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id., more than 130,000 patients were included in the studies.  
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id.  
66 Id. at 2791-92. 
67 Id. at 2792, citing United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (CA9 1978). 
68 Id. at 2792. 
69 Id.  
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
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accepted in that particular field cannot be considered reliable, and is therefore inadmissible. 72 Unpublished 
reanalyses, where the outcome was significantly different to the original published analyses, were problematic, as 
no scrutiny and/or verification of those results had taken place.73  
 
The USSC granted certiorari in order to determine whether the Frye test was still good law, and if it was, whether 
the test should require that expert scientific testimony had been subjected to peer review in order to be 
admissible.74 Following discussions around Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the USSC decided that evidence would 
need to be both reliable and relevant to be admissible.75 
 
In summary, Daubert lists five key factors that courts should consider when determining whether expert scientific 
testimony is scientifically valid and reliable. These factors are whether a theory, method or technique (1) can or 
has been tested; (2) has been subjected to scrutiny through peer review and publication; (3) has a known or 
potential rate of error; (4) has existing standards and controls; and (5) has been generally accepted by a relevant 
scientific community. 76  However, these key factors do not constitute a check list and there is a need for 
flexibility.77 
 
C. THE DAUBERT TRILOGY 
The current federal standard for admissibility of scientific expert evidence in the US has been established through 
three cases in particular, commonly referred to as the Daubert Trilogy. Although this standard is not universally 
incorporated at state level, many states have adopted it. The USSC revisited the issue of admissibility in General 
Electric Co v. Joiner78 and Kumho Tire Co Ltd v. Carmichael79 in order to clarify Daubert further.  
 
In 1983, Georgia City discovered that the dielectric fluid in some of its transformers were contaminated with 
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), known to be hazardous to the health of humans.80 Robert Joiner worked as an 
electrician for Georgia City from 1973 and came in contact with PCBs in the course of his employment.81 In 1991, 
Joiner was diagnosed with small cell lung cancer and in 1992 he sued General Electric Co., the manufacturer of 
the transformers and the dielectric fluid, in a Georgia state court.82 Joiner’s law suit “alleged that his exposure to 
PCBs “promoted” his cancer; had it not been for his exposure to these substances, his cancer would not have 
developed for many years, if at all.”83 Joiner provided the court with a number of depositions by expert witnesses 
which stated that PCBs and their derivatives can promote cancer and that these were the likely source of his 
cancer.84 However, Joiner had also been a smoker for eight years and there was a history of lung cancer in his 
family.85  
 
The case was moved to the District Court by General Electric. Although the District Court stated that there was a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Joiner had been exposed to PCBs, it granted General Electric’s request 
for summary judgment.86 The reasons for this was that there was no evidence that Joiner had suffered significant 
exposure to PCBs and that Joiner’s experts had failed to establish a causal link between PCBs and small cell lung 
cancer.87 The expert evidence presented by Joiner was held to be inadmissible as, according to the District Court, 
it was based on “subjective belief or unsupported speculation.”88  
 
                                                          
72 Id.  
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 2793. 
75 Id. at 2794-95. In brief, Rule 702 provides that scientific knowledge may be presented in court by a qualified witness if it 
assists the trier of fact to understand the evidence. 
76 Daubert, 509 U.S. 
77 See, e.g., ROBIN T. BOWEN, ETHICS AND THE PRACTICE OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 69 (2010). 
78 General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
79 Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).   
80 Joiner, 522 U.S. at 136. 
81 Id. at 139. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 139-40. 
84 Id. at 139.  
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 140. 
87 Id.  
88 Id. at 136. 
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The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed this decision, based on two fundamental errors in the 
District Court’s judgment.89 In the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion, the District Court should not have excluded the 
expert testimony as its role should only be to determine the legal reliability of the evidence.90 Deciding on the 
weight of competing expert testimonies should be a question for the jury and the court should not exclude 
testimony because it draws a different conclusion than the experts.91 The Eleventh Circuit also found that there 
was evidence on record that supported the proposition that Joiner had been exposed to furans and dioxins.92 
 
The USSC granted certiorari and subsequently reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment, affirming the previous 
ruling by the District Court.93 The USCC confirmed that the abuse of discretion standard should be used when 
reviewing a District Court’s decision to admit or exclude expert scientific evidence,94 and that a proper application 
of this standard would indicate that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the evidence, 
as the studies were significantly dissimilar to the facts of the case.95 The evidence which Joiner had presented was 
based on studies conducted on mice, none of which had actually demonstrated that adult mice developed cancer 
after exposure to PCBs.96 Thus, the USCC decision in Joiner verified that trial judges have a gate-keeping role 
and may exclude expert evidence where there are analytical gaps between the data and the opinions proffered.97   
 
In Kumho Tire Co Ltd v. Carmichael98 in 1999, the USSC had the opportunity to review how the Daubert ruling 
applied to evidence provided by experts other than scientists. In 1993, Patrick Carmichael was driving a minivan 
when a rear tire blew out, causing the vehicle to overturn.99 One of his passengers was killed and several other 
were severely injured in the accident. The Carmichaels, survivors of the accident and representatives of the 
deceased, sued the maker of the tire, Kumho Tire Company, and the distributors, claiming that the tire was 
defective.100  
 
The Carmichaels relied on expert testimony provided by a senior engineer who specialised in tire failure 
analysis.101 The engineer had concluded that the accident was caused by a defect in the design or manufacturing 
of the tire. 102 However, as the engineer had relied on methodology which was partly disputed, Kumho Tire 
Company asked the District Court to exclude this testimony.103 The District Court agreed that the methodology 
did not satisfy current standards under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as it was insufficiently reliable.104 The 
testimony was excluded and Kumho Tire Company was granted a summary judgment.105  
 
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed this judgment, stating that a federal trial judge’s gate-
keeping role was limited to scientific testimony.106 The District Court should not have excluded the testimony 
from an engineer, which the Eleventh Circuit referred to as being based on skills and experience.107 
 
The USSC granted certiorari to determine whether a federal trial judge’s gate-keeping obligations were limited to 
scientific evidence or if this should apply to testimonies which were based on skills and experience as well.108 In 
a unanimous decision, the USSC held that the gate-keeping obligations should apply to all expert evidence as it 
was virtually impossible to distinguish between technical and scientific knowledge and that “conceptual efforts to 
distinguish the two are unlikely to produce clear legal lines capable of application in particular cases.”109 The 
USSC further concluded that the District Court had acted within its discretion when it determined that the 
                                                          
89 Id. at 140.  
90 Id. at 141. 
91 Id.  
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 144-45. 
96 Id. at 144.  
97 See in particular Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion, id. at 147-49. 
98 Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).   
99 Id. at 137.  
100 Id.  
101 Id.  
102 Id. 
103 Id.  
104 Id. 
105 Id.  
106 Id. 
107 Id.   
108 Id. at 138. 
109 Id. at 148.  
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methodology used by the engineer was unreliable and excluded this testimony.110 Thus, Kumho Tire verified that 
trial judges were not only the gate-keepers of scientific evidence, but that the discretion to admit or exclude 
extended to all types of expert evidence.111   
 
D. THE US FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 
The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) were developed in 1973 by codifying existing USSC decisions and common 
evidentiary rules in place at the time,112 and these were enacted and incorporated into statutory law in 1975.113  
 
Rule 702, Testimony by Witness, states that:  
 
“A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the 
form of an opinion or otherwise if: 
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; 
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and 
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.”114 
 
The spirit of Daubert is obvious in the text of FRE 702.115 However, Rule 702 needs to be considered alongside 
Rule 703, Bases of an Expert’s Opinion Testimony, and Rule 705, Disclosing the Facts or Data Underlying an 
Expert’s Opinion.  
 
Rule 703 states that:  
 
“An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally 
observed. If experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an 
opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted. But if the facts or data would 
otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury only if their probative value 
in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.”116 
 
Rule 703 has attracted criticism for allowing evidence which would be inadmissible under other rules to be brought 
in ‘through the back door’.117 This is because experts are still allowed to rely on such information and facts and 
may, in some circumstances, even be allowed to disclose this inadmissible information to the jury.118 In addition, 
under FRE Rule 705, experts may choose to disclose information underlying their opinion evidence, but they are 
not required to do so.119 However, even if such information is not disclosed as part of the opinion evidence given, 
the opposing party may still try to establish the basis for the expert’s opinion during cross-examination.120 
 
The legal frameworks for admissibility have evolved over the last century, with the courts and legislatures 
attempting to acknowledge that science must be both relevant and reliable in order to be used in the legal process. 
The law governing admissibility has also developed over decades in E&W as Part III will explain.  
 
III. ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN ENGLAND AND WALES 
                                                          
110 Id. at 139. 
111 Id. at 158.  
112 BOWEN, supra note 77, at 66. 
113 David G. Owen, A Decade of Daubert, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 345, 355 (2002-2003). 
114 FEDERAL EVIDENCE REVIEW, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 2015, 30 (2015), available at 
http://federalevidence.com/downloads/rules.of.evidence.pdf. 
115 Surprisingly, Daubert was not incorporated into the FRE until 2001. Up until then, FRE 702 allowed the admission of 
scientific or technical evidence by a qualified expert if such testimony would assist the trier of fact. See Owen, supra note 113, 
at 358, 361. 
116 FEDERAL EVIDENCE REVIEW, supra note 114.    
117 Ian Volek, Federal Rule of Evidence 703: The Back Door and the Confrontation Clause, Ten Years Later, 80 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 959, 963 (2011).  
118 Id. at 985.   
119 Id. at 969.   
120 FEDERAL EVIDENCE REVIEW, supra note 114, at 31. 
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The admissibility framework for scientific evidence in E&W originates from the 1975 case R v. Turner.121 This 
framework has been criticised for being unclear, with scholars such as Roberts and Zuckerman stating that this 
precedent, “to where many of the phantom ‘rules’ trace their origin, has been especially vulnerable to 
misinterpretation.”122 Furthermore, with the significant advances in science over the last fifty years, it has been 
argued that the common law approach to the admissibility of science in E&W is outdated and needs to be 
reformed.123  
 
A. THE COMMON LAW ADMISSIBILITY TEST 
The body of law relating to the admissibility of opinion evidence provided by expert witnesses in criminal 
proceedings in E&W has developed within the common law, and is referred to as “the common law admissibility 
test.”124 It is generally accepted that there are four requirements which need to be satisfied under the common law 
test in order for an expert’s opinion evidence to be admissible. 125 These are: assistance, relevant expertise, 
impartiality and evidentiary reliability. 126 Each requirement has its own set of rules, which will be explored 
further. 
 
i. Assistance 
The assistance requirement originates from the judgment in R v. Turner.127 In Turner, the defendant had repeatedly 
hit his girlfriend with a hammer after she told him that the child she was carrying was not his.128 The defense 
wanted to call a psychiatrist to provide expert opinion evidence that the defendant’s personality meant that, 
although he did not show any signs of mental illness, he killed his girlfriend in “an explosive release of blind 
rage.”129  
 
The court confirmed that an expert’s opinion would be admissible “to furnish the court with scientific information 
which is likely to be outside the experience and knowledge of a judge or jury.”130 The court further suggested that 
such evidence would be unnecessary (and therefore inadmissible) where the judge or jury could form their own 
conclusions “without help.”131 The psychiatrist’s evidence was not admissible, as, in the words of Lawton LJ, 
people “who are deeply in love can, and sometimes do, have outbursts of blind rage when discovering unexpected 
wantonness on the part of their loved ones ... Jurors do not need psychiatrists to tell them how ordinary folk who 
are not suffering from any mental illness are likely to react to the stresses and strains of life.”132 Twenty years 
later, the Canadian Supreme Court noted, in R v. Mohan, 133 that “to be admissible an expert’s evidence is 
“necessary” only in the limited sense that it has to provide helpful information which is likely to be outside a 
judge or jury’s knowledge and experience.”134 This rationale has subsequently been imported by courts in E&W. 
 
ii. Relevant expertise 
The requirement of relevant expertise comes with two general assumptions. First, that there is a recognisable 
relevant field within which the issue at hand can be classified,135 and secondly, that it is possible to gain expertise 
within this particular field.136 The Law Commission has stated that in order to give expert evidence at trial, the 
individual “claiming expertise must be an expert in the relevant field.”137  
 
                                                          
121 R v. Turner, [1975] 1 All ER 70. 
122 ROBERTS & ZUCKERMAN, supra note 46, at 483.  
123 This is clearly highlighted by the Law Commissions efforts in 2009 and 2011. See THE LAW COMMISSION 2009, supra 
note 4; THE LAW COMMISSION 2011, supra note 14.   
124 THE LAW COMMISSION 2011, supra note 14, at 13. 
125 Id.  
126 Id.  
127 R v. Turner, [1975] 1 All ER 70. 
128 CHRISTOPHER ALLEN, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO EVIDENCE 377 (4th ed. 2008). Id. 
129 Id. 
130 R v. Turner, [1975] 1 All ER 70 at 841. 
131 Id. 
132 Id., emphasis added.  
133 R v. Mohan, [1994] 2 SCR 9, 10f (appeal taken from Can.) 
134 THE LAW COMMISSION 2011, supra note 14, at 13.  
135 ROBERTS & ZUCKERMAN, supra note 46, at 496. 
136 Id. 
137 THE LAW COMMISSION, supra note 14, at 13. 
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Notably, a lack of formal qualifications will not prevent a person from being seen as a competent expert witness. 
This was first seen in the 1894 case of R v. Silverlock,138 where it was established that a person did not need formal 
or rigorous training to be seen as an expert, as long as their informal interest and study of the subject was 
sufficient.139  
 
In 1984, the requirement of relevant expertise was outlined by the Supreme Court of South Australia in R v. 
Bonython,140 a judgment which has frequently been cited by the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) (CACD) for 
E&W. The defendant in Bonython had been convicted of forgery after falsifying a victim’s signature to obtain 
money. In the judgment it was stated by King CJ that relevant expertise would be where “the witness has acquired 
by study or experience sufficient knowledge of the subject to render his [or her] opinion of value in resolving the 
issues before the court.”141 The court confirmed that expert opinion evidence provided by a police sergeant who 
had acquired expertise in the comparison of handwriting and identification of signatures (a recognised field for 
expert testimony), was admissible even though this expertise did not come from a formal course or study.142 
 
There have been some restraints on the admission of irrelevant expertise in the courts in E&W. For example, in 
the 1991 case of R v. Robb,143 it was suggested that expert opinion evidence by an amateur psychologist would 
be inadmissible. 144  Nevertheless, the use of expert witnesses without formal qualifications has been seen 
frequently, for example in the 2003 case of R v. Hodges,145 where drug-squad officers were allowed to give 
evidence on street prices and other issues relating to the drugs trade.146  
 
The Law Commission has recommended that the threshold for determining relevant expertise should be threefold 
and include: “a requirement of proof on the balance of probabilities”;147 that “amateurs are not qualified to give 
some types of expert evidence”;148 and that some fields, such as DNA analysis, already have explicit guidelines 
for determining expertise.149  
 
iii. Impartiality 
It has been suggested that the CACD never tires of saying that the professional duties of expert witnesses are 
“owed to the court and override any obligation to the person from whom the expert has received instructions or 
by whom the expert is paid. It is hardly necessary to say that experts should maintain professional objectivity and 
impartiality at all times.”150 Indeed, it is explicitly set out in Rule 33.2 of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2013151 
that an expert’s duty is to give objective and unbiased opinion evidence to the court based on matters within their 
expertise.152 However, the CACD made it clear in R v. Stubbs153 that apparent bias does not necessarily make an 
expert’s evidence inadmissible.154 In Stubbs, fraudulent money transfers had been made from the HSBC Bank. 
One of the prosecution’s experts was an employee of the HSBC who had headed the internal investigation into 
the money transfers.155 The CACD confirmed that the expert’s employment and the importance of the case to the 
HSBC did not disqualify the expert from giving expert evidence.156 The court considered that “it was a matter for 
the jury to determine whether there was any conscious or unconscious bias or lack of objectivity” and that this 
was related to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.157  
 
                                                          
138 R v. Silverlock, [1894] 2 Q.B. 766 (Eng.). 
139 Id. 
140 R v. Bonython, (1984) 38 SASR 45. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 R v. Robb, [1991] 93 Cr App R 161. 
144 Id.  
145 R v. Hodges, [2003] EWCA Crim 290. 
146 Id. 
147 THE LAW COMMISSION, supra note 14, at 14. 
148 Id. 
149 Id.  
150 See ROBERTS & ZUCKERMAN, supra note 46, at 509, citing R v. Bowman, [2006] EWCA Crim 417. 
151 Part 33 of the Criminal Procedure Rules as in force on 7 October 2013, available at 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/criminal/docs/2012/crim-proc-rules-2013-part-33.pdf.   
152 Id. at Rule 33.2.  
153 R v. Stubbs, [2006] EWCA Crim 2312.   
154 Id. at [68]. 
155 Id. at [26].  
156 Id. at [59]. 
157 Id.  
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Referring to both Bonython and Stubbs, the court in Leo Sawrij v. North Cumbria Magistrates’ Court158 in 2009 
also confirmed that a commercial relationship with a party to the litigation will not disqualify a person as an 
expert, as “it is not appropriate in criminal cases to rule an expert's evidence as inadmissible simply on the basis 
that he has some connection with the party who is intending to call him.”159 The court also made the point that 
any difference in approach to impartiality in civil cases was of no relevance as this was a criminal case.160   
 
iv. Evidentiary reliability  
The requirement of evidentiary reliability has become somewhat unclear in E&W. Trial and appellate courts have 
relied on a mixture of judgments to interpret this requirement, including the US case of Frye and the Australian 
case of Bonython.  
 
Although concerned with psychological evidence rather than ‘hard science’, the case of Edward Gilfoyle provides 
a good illustration of the blurred situation in E&W.161 Gilfoyle was convicted of his heavily pregnant wife Paula’s 
murder in 1993, the year after she had been found dead hanging from a ceiling beam in the couple’s garage.162 
The prosecution alleged that Gilfoyle somehow made his wife write a suicide note and then forced or tricked her 
to climb a ladder in the garage and put her head through the noose.163 
 
For the trial, psychologist Professor David Canter164 had been asked by the police to examine notes that Gilfoyle 
and Paula had written, including a suicide note from Paula that had been found in their house.165 This was done 
in an attempt to decide whether the notes were written by Paula or dictated by Gilfoyle, and whether it was her 
intention to kill herself.166 Without having done anything of this nature before, and without being allowed to speak 
to either Gilfoyle or anyone from Paula’s family, Professor Canter came to the conclusion that Paula “had probably 
not written the note with the intention of killing herself.”167 The ‘psychological autopsy’ that Canter had produced 
was found to be inadmissible and thus never used in court.168 However, Canter has stated that even though it was 
never used “the report itself bolstered the determination on the prosecution.”169 With the absence of any hard 
evidence, the defense had difficulties opposing any of the claims made by the prosecution.170  
 
Following Gilfoyle’s conviction, Professor Canter re-examined the case and carried out additional research. 
During the second appeal in 2001, R v. Gilfoyle (No 2),171 Gilfoyle’s defense wanted to use Canter’s more 
comprehensive ‘psychological autopsy’ which now stated that the evidence demonstrated that Paula had killed 
herself.172 The CACD confirmed that in accordance with R v. Strudwick and Merry,173 the guiding principle 
appeared to be in line with the Frye test, namely that to be admissible, new and developing areas of science must 
be accepted by the scientific community as being able to provide an accurate and reliable opinion.174 The CACD 
concluded that “the present academic status of psychological autopsies is not, in our judgment, such as to permit 
them to be admitted as a basis for expert opinion before a jury.”175  
 
It is perhaps surprising that the CACD seemingly decided to adopt the Frye test to keep this form of evidence out 
of the court room, as this test had already been replaced in several US jurisdictions in favour of Daubert by that 
                                                          
158 Leo Sawrij v. North Cumbria Magistrates’ Court, [2009] EWHC 2823. 
159 Id. at [23]. 
160 Id.  
161 R v. Gilfoyle (No 2), [2001] 2 Cr App R 5. 
162 Id. at [1]. 
163 R v. Gilfoyle, [1996] 1 Cr App R 302. 
164 Professor Canter’s biography and resume can be viewed here: http://www.davidcanter.com/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).   
165 David V. Canter, Suicide or murder? Implicit narratives in the Eddie Gilfoyle case, in THE FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGIST'S 
CASEBOOK: PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILING AND CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, 315, 319 (Laurence Alison ed., 2005). 
166 Id. at 320.  
167 Id. at 321. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 See R v. Gilfoyle, [1996] 1 Cr App R 302 and R v. Gilfoyle (No 2), [2001] 2 Cr App R 5. It may also be argued that the 
report by Professor Canter could have led to case construction, see Marika L. Henneberg & Barry W. Loveday in this 
Special Issue.  
171 R v. Gilfoyle (No 2), [2001] 2 Cr App R 5. 
172 Canter, supra note 165, at 321; R v. Gilfoyle (No 2), [2001] 2 Cr App R 5.  
173 R v. Strudwick and Merry, [1993] 99 Cr App R 326.  
174 Id. at 332; D.C. Ormerod & Clare Barsby, Case Comment – Evidence: murder – whether “psychological autopsy” of 
victim admissible, to show likelihood of suicide, CRIM. L. REV. 312, 313 (2001).  
175  R v. Gilfoyle (No 2), [2001] 2 Cr App R 5, [25].  
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time. Even though the criteria for assessing evidentiary reliability were not clearly explained in case law for E&W, 
Ormerod and Barsby suggested that the apparent approval of Frye by the CACD “could well create difficulties.”176 
In particular, the Frye test seems to contradict the 1991 decision by the CACD in Robb,177 where it was suggested 
that the minority view of phoneticians178 was admissible, and the common law principle verified in R v Clarke,179 
that it would be wrong to exclude evidence which would be of advantage to the court simply because it is based 
on new techniques or advances in science not yet recognised by the courts.180  
 
A significant case which drew attention to the important issue of evidentiary reliability was that of Mark 
Dallagher, who was convicted of murder in 1998 based on ear print comparison evidence.181 The victim had been 
killed in her bed during a break-in and the perpetrator left ear prints on a window. During the trial, the prosecution 
had relied on the testimony of two experts in ear print comparisons.182 In the appeal, it was argued by Dallagher 
that the jury should not have been allowed to hear the ear print comparison evidence as there were misgivings 
about the accuracy of such evidence.183 The CACD decided that the evidence was admissible.184 However, the 
Court also noted that if the jury had heard evidence from three forensic scientists that questioned the reliability of 
ear print comparison evidence, available at the appeal, it was reasonable to assume that this would have had an 
impact on the jury’s decision to convict.185 However, the CACD also stated that “the trial judge could not possibly 
have concluded that the Crown’s expert evidence was irrelevant, or so unreliable that it should be excluded.”186  
 
Dallagher’s appeal was allowed and a retrial was ordered. However, the retrial came to a halt after only ten days. 
In January 2004 all charges against Dallagher were formally dropped after it was confirmed that DNA recovered 
from the ear print excluded him as the donor.187 In this case, DNA clearly showed that the ear print evidence used 
in the trial had been unreliable.  
 
It is worth noting that if the court in Dallagher had adopted the Frye test, it would have been clear from US cases 
that ear print comparison techniques were not generally accepted by the scientific community.188 Equally, if the 
Daubert test had been adopted the ear print evidence would have failed to satisfy all the criteria of that test.189 
However, Daubert is not a check list, and techniques are often admissible even when they have failed one of the 
criteria.190  
 
New fields of scientific expertise were also questioned in 2004, in R v. Luttrell and Others,191 where a skilled lip-
reader had given evidence for the prosecution as to what was said between Luttrell and a co-accused in footage 
which had been caught on CCTV.192 The appellants had been convicted of conspiracy to handle stolen goods and 
appealed against the decision to allow lip-reading evidence at the trials, stating that such evidence had not been 
shown to be reliable and a warning should have been given to the jury.193 The CACD noted that such evidence, 
like facial mapping, was a type of “real evidence” which was capable of passing the ordinary tests of relevance 
and reliability,194 and was therefore potentially admissible in evidence. Once ruled to be admissible by a judge, 
the “actual reliability of the evidence will be determined by the jury in the light of cross-examination of the witness 
                                                          
176 Ormerod & Barsby, supra note 174, at 314. 
177 R v. Robb, [1991] 93 Cr App R 161. 
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179 R v. Clarke, [1995] 2 Cr App R 425. 
180 THE LAW COMMISSION 2009, supra note 4, at 20-22.   
181 R v. Dallagher, [2002] EWCA Crim 1903. 
182 Id. at [9].  
183 Id. at [6]. 
184 Id. at [29]. 
185 Id. at [24]. 
186 Id. at [29]. 
187 Bob Woffinden, Earprint Landed Innocent Man in Jail for Murder, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 23, 2004. 
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CRIM. L. REV. 821, 823 (2002). 
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193 Id. at [39]. Appellants further stated that the prosecution had not disclosed all material relevant to the lip-reader’s 
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194 Id. at [37].  
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and any contradictory expert evidence adduced by the opposing party.”195 It was further stated that such evidence 
did require a special warning from the judge as to its limitations and risks of error, but the specific terms of such 
a direction would depend on the facts of the particular case.196 The Law Commission has stated that there is “little 
judicial guidance, and certainly no consistent guidance, on how sufficiency of reliability is to be determined for 
expert evidence at the admissibility stage.”197  
 
In relation to deaths of infants, the infamous case of Sally Clark is a useful illustration of the lax attitude to 
evidentiary reliability that the courts in E&W have shown in the last couple of decades.198 Clark and her husband, 
both solicitors, lost two baby sons to Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS). Clark had been convicted on two 
counts of murder in 1999, and had her first appeal dismissed in 2000.199  In her second appeal in 2003, R v. Clark 
(No 2),200 the CACD quashed her convictions based on two main reasons. First, the pathologist who carried out 
the autopsy on the second infant had failed to disclose results of microbiological tests which indicated the 
possibility that the infant died of natural causes. 201  Secondly, the statistical evidence given by the then 
distinguished Professor of paediatrics Sir Roy Meadow was erroneous. 202 Professor Meadow was an expert 
witness for the prosecution, and he testified that in his opinion there was only a one in 73 million chance of having 
two cases of SIDS in the same family.203 This approach completely disregarded any genetic or environmental 
factors affecting the likelihood of several infant deaths in the same family.204 
 
The media was quick to blame this miscarriage of justice on Professor Meadow, but this is an overly simplistic 
explanation of a much larger problem.205 The CACD stated that it was “unfortunate that the trial did not feature 
any consideration as to whether the statistical evidence should be admitted in evidence.”206 Professor Meadow 
testified beyond his expertise and he got his calculations wrong.207 In summary, not only was the statistical 
evidence presented highly unreliable, but this approach also grouped the deaths together as a package even though 
the jury had been asked to consider separate verdicts in the two deaths.208  
 
Professor Meadow had testified in other cases of SIDS.209 Angela Cannings lost three of her four babies when 
they were less than 18 weeks old.210 She was convicted on two counts of murder after a trial where Professor 
Meadow had testified for the prosecution. Although Professor Meadow did not present the same statistical figures 
as in Clark, reference had been made to the rarity of multiple deaths in one family. 211 In the appeal, R v. 
Cannings,212 the CACD looked further into the scientific basis behind claims of what would be considered natural 
or unnatural cases of SIDS.213 It was clear to the court that there was a lot about death in infancy, including natural 
causes, that was still unknown.214 Experts could not agree on whether certain cases had a natural or unnatural 
cause of death, which indicated to the court that the scientific or medical basis on which to make such assertions 
was not strong enough to provide the sole evidence for prosecution.215 As a result of the Cannings case, there was 
a review of nearly 300 cases where a parent had been convicted of homicide or infanticide of a baby under the 
age of two.216  
 
                                                          
195 THE LAW COMMISSION 2009, supra note 4, at 18.  
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Lorraine Harris was convicted of the manslaughter of her infant son in 2000, after it was determined that the baby 
had shown the triad of symptoms believed to establish Shaken Baby Syndrome (SBS), namely subdural 
haemorrhage, retinal haemorrhage, hypoxic-iscaemic encephalopathy.217 On appeal in 2005, Harris’ case was 
heard together with three other convictions where infants had died or been seriously injured by a caregiver.218 
These were Faulder, Cherry and Rock, convicted of inflicting grievous bodily harm, manslaughter and murder 
respectively.219 The court found that new evidence undermined the notion that the mere presence of a triad of 
intra-cranial injuries would indicate a non-accidental head injury in a child. 220 The court acknowledged the 
unreliable nature of the evidence believed to indicate SBS, and quashed Harris’ conviction,221 although the court 
also emphasised their view that developments in scientific thinking should not be excluded from court “simply 
because they remain at the stage of a hypothesis.”222 In R v. Henderson and Others in 2010, the CACD discussed 
in some detail how cases such as these, which rely mainly on expert evidence, should be dealt with in court.223 
 
B. THE LAW COMMISSION’S PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 
In its 2009 Consultation Paper,224 the Law Commission discussed the case of Bonython225 in some detail in 
relation to the admissibility of expert evidence. In Bonython, the Supreme Court of South Australia had confirmed 
that part of the admissibility test in that jurisdiction was “whether the subject matter of the opinion forms part of 
a body of knowledge or experience which is sufficiently organized or recognized to be accepted as a reliable body 
of knowledge or experience.”226 
 
The extent to which Bonython actually applies in E&W has been debated. In a 2010 speech for the Forensic 
Science Society and King’s College, London, Lord Justice Leveson suggested that the evidentiary reliability part 
of Bonython did not at that time represent the current state of the law in E&W.227 However, both before and after 
this speech the CACD have made clear references to Bonython in at least two significant criminal appeals. In R v. 
Reed and Reed228 and R v. Broughton,229 two appeals where the reliability of Low Template DNA230 (DNA from 
minute samples) was questioned, the CACD seemed to accept that there was indeed a common law reliability test, 
at least for scientific evidence.231  
 
The Law Commission has suggested that part of the problem with evidentiary reliability is that the CACD has 
appeared to be reluctant to exclude new and developing areas of science from court232. The reliability requirement 
in the common law admissibility test was considered insufficiently robust,233 reflecting what they termed a laissez-
faire approach to the admissibility of expert evidence in E&W.234 It was also noted that juries tended to defer to 
an expert opinion, and that unreliable expert evidence was not effectively challenged in cross examination.235 
The Law Commission made proposals for statutory reform in the Draft Criminal Evidence (Experts) Bill 2011.236 
In that Bill, they advocated for an approach that did not focus upon the scientific status of the evidence proffered, 
but rather its reliability. 237 The Law Commission attempted to reduce the likelihood of unreliable scientific 
evidence being admitted into court by codifying existing common law principles and adopting a number of 
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characteristics from the USSC’s approach. 238  However, from the National Research Council’s report 
Strengthening the Forensic Sciences in the US: A Path Forward (the NRC Report),239  it appears that the US 
approach has often failed to prevent the admission of unreliable evidence. It is therefore unlikely that the Law 
Commission’s proposals, which drew heavily on Daubert, would have prevented unreliable scientific evidence 
from being admitted into the courts.240  
Edmond suggested that the Law Commission’s proposals would not bring about the changes needed, and that the 
approach did little more than turning admissibility decisions and the reliability of expert opinions into questions 
of law.241 However, some scholars have agreed that the Law Commission should be commended for tackling this 
issue,242 with Ward arguing that the proposals provided some well needed clarity on the issue, but that judges 
could use their existing powers to achieve similar results.243 Considering critical studies such as the NRC Report 
(2009),244 Garrett (2011),245 and the Scottish fingerprint inquiry (2012),246 it is questionable whether judges are 
equipped to act as ‘gate-keepers’ to ensure only accurate and reliable evidence is entered into the courts.247  
The government rejected the proposed Bill in November 2013.248 Reasons for the rejection included the costs that 
extra pre-trial hearings to determine the reliability of evidence would involve.249 The government suggested that 
changes could be made to existing legislation, such as the Criminal Procedure Rules, to accommodate some of 
the recommendations from the proposal.250 As a result, to this date, there is no statutory reliability test in place in 
E&W.  
 
IV. CONTROVERSIES RELATING TO MEDICAL AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CASES 
OF ALLEGED SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME / ABUSIVE HEAD TRAUMA 
In E&W, three categories of miscarriages of justice caused by expert evidence have been scrutinized by the courts 
and the Law Commission recently.251 According to Phillips, these are cases where the expert (1) “deliberately 
misled the court,”252 (2) testified beyond or outside their expertise,253 and (3), where the expert has relied “on 
flawed or faulty forensic or diagnostic techniques.”254  
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The CACD has acknowledged that SBS/AHT cases are largely relying on expert evidence of a complex nature.255 
However, the adversarial system does not appear to be an objective ‘truth-finder’, and Roberts256 supports the 
notion that the “adversarial procedure is sometimes suboptimal for truth-finding.”257 This is also apparent when 
looking at what has been aptly described as “litigation-driven science”,258 where arguments from both sides of the 
SBS/AHT debate have been exacerbated.259 At the heart of this debate is whether a triad of symptoms, namely 
subdural hemorrhage, retinal hemorrhage and hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy, is pathognomonic of 
SBS/AHT.260  
The reliability of evidence relating to alleged SBS/AHT cases appears to be particularly problematic in the heavily 
polarized debate around SBS/AHT, especially in relation to the triad of symptoms thought to be pathognomonic 
of SBS/AHT. 261 In order to improve our understanding of the symptoms included in the triad, studies and 
experiments have been carried out in a variety of different disciplines, including anatomy, engineering, medicine 
and pathology.262  
In 2003, Geddes et al suggested a new hypothesis around the triad of symptoms, which is often referred to as 
“Geddes Unified Hypothesis” or Geddes III.263 The unifying hypothesis is a proposition that the triad of symptoms 
associated with SBS can be caused by severe hypoxia (lack of oxygen in the tissues).264 This may lead to brain 
swelling. 265  This, combined with raised intracranial pressure, could produce both subdural and retinal 
hemorrhages and can be seen in natural deaths as well as in alleged SBS cases.266 Accordingly it was asserted 
that any incidents of apnea (the cessation of breathing) set in motion a cascade of events leading to the triad of 
symptoms often associated with SBS.267 This questions the validity of the triad as a diagnostic tool and suggests 
that apnea may have many different causes, including trauma or abuse.  
Squier and Mack researched structures of the cranium, including the dura, arachnoid barrier and the bridging 
veins, and how these developed in infants.268 Their findings challenged beliefs that bridging vein rupture was the 
cause of subdural hemorrhage in this particular age group, and suggested that rupturing of a rich plexus of 
intradural vessels may be the cause of subdural hemorrhage without trauma.269 A similar study noted decreased 
levels of cerebrospinal fluid in subdural hemorrhage without trauma, and acknowledged that the dura was 
incredibly complex and that a better understanding of it would provide important insights into subdural 
hemorrhages.270  
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A study of ten teenage athletes who had suffered acute subdural hemorrhage drew multiple parallels between these 
teenage athletes and infants diagnosed with non-accidental trauma.271 The study suggested that a “second impact 
syndrome”,272 which occurs when a second injury is sustained before the first injury has healed, may be relevant 
to the SBS debate.273 In addition, the higher representation of males in cases of SBS/AHT was considered in a 
study which provided several biological explanations for such an overrepresentation,274 which further undermined 
the case for the triad as pathognomonic of SBS as these causes mimicked child abuse.275   
Retinal hemorrhages in infants have also been studied. In 2009, Togioka et al analyzed 66 academic articles that 
covered the subject, and concluded that although the presence of retinal hemorrhages did not guarantee SBS, it 
was rare in cases of non-accidental head injury whereas it appeared to be common in abused children.276 However, 
studies have since explored a number of alternative causes for retinal hemorrhages in infants.277 For example, it 
was suspected that a five-week old child had sustained a non-accidental injury after experiencing a rapid onset of 
symptoms including drowsiness and hypotonia, unilateral retinal hemorrhages and an intracranial hemorrhage in 
the posterior fossa.278 An arteriovenous malformation was discovered at a repeat neuroimaging scan weeks later, 
which would have contributed to the retinal hemorrhages and this removed the suspicion of a non-accidental 
injury.279 The autopsy findings from four children aged three or younger found that retinal hemorrhages, which 
had been caused by fatal consequences of infection complications, mimicked some patterns in retinal hemorrhages 
associated with non-accidental trauma.280  
In addition, a study which looked at two babies who had experienced fatal head injuries in utero following motor 
vehicle accidents, noted that both had extensive retinal hemorrhages and optic nerve sheet hemorrhages with 
peripapillary intrascleral hemorrhages. 281 The authors commented that, on the rare occasions that they were 
discussed in the relevant literature, peripapillary intrascleral hemorrhages were considered pathognomonic for 
abusive head trauma. 282 As the babies had been in utero a shaking motion was highly unlikely. Therefore, 
peripapillary intrascleral hemorrhages should not necessarily be considered conclusively the agnostic of abusive 
head trauma.283    
Experiments to improve our understanding of the symptoms of SBS/AHT have been carried out. These have had 
varying results, but no experiment has unequivocally confirmed that the triad of symptoms is pathognomonic to 
SBS/AHT. For example, the shaking of a computational model of an infant eye suggested that shaking alone was 
enough to cause retinal hemorrhaging. 284 The shaking of an automotive dummy showed that biomechanical 
investigations of SBS provided more accurate results “if the skull with paediatric features and the brain-skull 
interface are correctly represented.”285 The vigorous shaking of anesthetized lambs found only minimal axonal 
injury, subdural hemorrhages and retinal hemorrhages, although there was widespread neuronal perikaryal 
                                                          
271 Robert C. Cantu & Alisa D. Gean, Second-Impact Syndrome and a Small Sub Dual Haematoma: an Uncommon 
Catastrophic Result of Repetitive Head Injury with a Characteristic Imaging Appearance, 27(9) J. NEUROTRAUMA 1557 
(2010). 
272 Second-impact syndrome (SIS) is often seen in athletes. It involves a person suffering post-concussive symptoms 
following a head injury, and if sustaining a second head injury within a short time span this can lead to the brain swelling 
rapidly, and catastrophically. For a thorough discussion see Tareg Bey & Brian Ostick, Second Impact Syndrome, 10(1) W. 
J. EMERGENCY MED. 6 (2009).  
273 Cantu & Gean, supra note 271.  
274 Rubin Miller & Marvin Miller, Overrepresentation of Males in Traumatic Brain Injury of Infancy and in Infants with 
Macrocephaly: Further Evidence That Questions the Existence of Shaken Baby Syndrome, 31(2) 165 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. 
& PATHOLOGY 165 (2010). 
275 Id. at 165.  
276 Brandon M. Togioka et al., Retinal Hemorrhages and Shaking Baby Syndrome: An Evidence-Based Review, 37(1) J. 
EMERGENCY MED. 98 (2009).  
277 Findley et al., supra note 20, at 339-240; Aravind R. Reddy, Michael Clarke & Vernon Long, Unilateral Retinal 
Hemorrhages with Subarachnoid Hemorrhage in a Five – Week – Old Infant: Is This Nonaccidental Injury? 20(4) EUR. J. 
OPTHAMOLOGY 799 (2010); Marcus C. Salvatori & Partick E. Lantz, Retinal Haemorrhages Associated with Fatal 
Paediatric Infections, 55(2) MED. SCI. LAW 121 (2015). 
278 Reddy, Clarke & Long, supra note 277.   
279 Id. at 799. 
280 Salvatori & Lantz, supra note 277.  
281 Candace H. Schoppe & Patrick E. Lantz, Are Peripapillary Intrascleral Hemorrhages Pathognomonic for Abusive Head 
Trauma?, 58(1) J. FORENSIC SCI. 228 (2013). 
282 Id. at 228.  
283 Id. at 231.  
284 Hans, Bawab & Woodhouse, supra note 262.  
285 Cheng, Howard & Rennison, supra note 262, at 2887.   
18 
 
amyloid precursor protein expression.286 Finally, a computational model of an infant brain was subjected to 
periodic motion and the findings “provided an enhanced understanding of the effects of parameter uncertainty on 
the dynamics of SBS.”287  
As early as 2006, it was widely recognized, that there were many “mimics” of SBS/AHT.288  In a 2011 article, 
Squier discussed alternative and common causes for the triad of symptoms, including accidental falls, cortical 
vein and sinus thrombosis, inflicted injury, vitamin D deficiency, second impact syndrome, aneurysm rupture, 
rare genetic conditions, and resuscitation related injuries.289  
In contrast, also in 2011, Narang argued that evidence-based medical literature supported the scientific soundness 
of AHT and, therefore, satisfied all the criteria under Daubert.290 Narang further disregarded Geddes’ Unified 
Hypothesis and Squier and Mack’s dural immature vascular plexus theory, pointing out that studies existed that 
showed that retinal hemorrhages and subdural hemorrhages were statistically significantly correlated with AHT.291    
Findley et al responded to the criticism and identified methodological problems with Narang’s article, including 
statistical misinterpretations and observer bias, and went on to clearly state the main scientific points behind the 
“new paradigm.”292 Furthermore, as Findley et al point out, “Changing the name of the syndrome from SBS to 
AHT does not, however, resolve the disagreement.”293  
What emerges from the above discussions is that this is a field in crisis. Medical, legal, academic and other 
scholars have voiced concern about the use of the SBS/AHT triad of symptoms as a tool for diagnosis and 
prosecution, as significant medical and scientific evidence discredits its very existence. Each of the symptoms 
contained in the triad have several natural and accidental causes in addition to abuse, so it is therefore difficult to 
see how the triad could be considered reliable in a medical or scientific sense. Maintaining that the triad is reliable 
in a legal sense is simply absurd.  
Furthermore, it needs to be questioned how objective the science around the triad and identification of SBS/AHT 
really is. Although the identification of symptoms might be objective (i.e. symptoms are present and correctly 
identified), concluding that these symptoms are indeed evidence consistent with non-accidental injuries appears 
to be a completely subjective exercise.294   
In the US case of Del Prete v. Thompson in 2014, the court was explicitly suspicious of the SBS/AHT diagnosis.295 
In a footnote to the opinion, the court wrote that the testimony and evidence presented “arguably suggests that a 
claim of shaken baby syndrome is more an article of faith than a proposition of science.”296 A year later, in early 
2015, an open letter signed by an international group of 34 doctors, medical professionals, and international 
experts outlined the problems with how cases of SBS/AHT were being prosecuted by the courts in the US and 
E&W.297 In the letter, the authors noted that “SBS has never been proved as anything more than an hypothesis”,298 
and urged both criminal and civil courts to listen to both sides of the disagreements around the diagnosis.299  
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Despite the controversies outlined above, in E&W the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) still rely on guidelines 
from March 2011 on how to prosecute cases of “non accidental head injury” (NAHI).300 Changing the term from 
SBS to non accidental head injury does not change the fact that it is still the triad of symptoms that will be relied 
upon for a prosecution. The CPS states that “cases will usually be diagnosed by a Triad of internal head injuries”301 
and “will usually require the Triad of injuries plus supporting evidence.”302  It is also states that Geddes’ Unified 
Hypothesis has not been endorsed by the CACD.303 Although a positive step has been taken by acknowledging 
that the triad alone should usually not be the sole basis for a prosecution, there are still dangers associated with 
the supporting evidence, as this also needs to be reliable, relevant and objective. As discussed by Henneberg and 
Loveday in this special issue, the mere finding of the triad of symptoms may influence the police investigation, 
leading to tunnel vision and case construction.304 Case construction occurs when the police and prosecution only 
focus on evidence which will support their hypothesis that a particular suspect is guilty, and any evidence to the 
contrary is excluded or its importance is minimized.305 This may result in the prosecution having insufficiently 
reliable evidence against a suspect admitted in court in order to bolster its case.306   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article has examined the admissibility of scientific evidence in criminal trials in the US and in E&W. The 
US approach was found to be more robust than that in E&W, although in relation to controversies around 
SBS/AHT, weaknesses have been noted in both. The NRC Report suggested that sciences should be improved 
before they could be considered reliable in court.307 In E&W, the focus has been on legal reliability rather than 
scientific reliability, which makes the common law admissibility framework relatively weak in comparison to the 
approach in the US.308  
Studies referred to in this article show that medical and scientific evidence believed to be pathognomonic of 
SBS/AHT need to be considered as highly unreliable.309 Edmond and San Roque state that adversarial legal 
systems assume that science and medical evidence is “epistemologically robust”310 although when scrutinized, a 
lot of such evidence “is either unreliable or of unknown reliability.”311 Litigation-driven science may be part of 
the problem, at least in the US, as it keeps the SBS/AHT debate extremely polarised.312 
The Law Commission identified a number of problems relating to the reliability of scientific evidence in criminal 
courts. 313 A contradiction can be seen as although courts have been shown to have a lax attitude towards 
evidentiary reliability, for example by allowing weak science such as ear prints into court, they appear to be 
holding on to outdated science for far too long. The question of admissibility then becomes a double-edged sword, 
and this is a problem in both the US and in E&W. To avoid this, courts need to recognize and consider significant 
developments relating to SBS/AHT, and use this to improve the quality of medical and scientific evidence before 
it is admitted into court. As weaknesses in the admissibility frameworks have been identified, this would be 
beneficial in both the US and in E&W.  
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